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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ziel des Beitrags ist die Analyse der sich ändernden Arbeitsmarktstruktur auf das soziale 
Sicherungssystem. Es wird aufgezeigt, dass die Restrukturierung des Arbeitsmarktes eine 
große Herausforderung für die Sozialpolitik darstellt und erheblich stärkere Wirkungen 
auf das soziale Sicherungssystem haben wird als die demographischen Veränderungen. 
Zahlreiche neue Erwerbstätigkeitsformen sind durch den Prozeß der Tertiarisierung ent-
standen. Darüber hinaus wurde diese Entwicklung politisch unterstützt und finanziell ge-
fördert. Allerdings bedingen diese neuen Formen der Erwerbstätigkeit spezifische Risiken. 
Aus individueller Sicht entsteht das Problem einer nicht ausreichenden Absicherung ge-
genüber den finanziellen Folgen des Eintritts von sozialen Risiken (z. B. Arbeitslosigkeit, 
Invalidität, Krankheit oder der Möglichkeit für eine adäquate Alterssicherung) innerhalb 
des sozialen Sicherungssystems. Aus institutioneller Sicht wird die finanzielle Basis des 
Systems der sozialen Sicherung geschwächt, da sich mit der sukzessiven Reduzierung der 
Anzahl der Pflichtversicherten zwangsläufig auch die Einnahmen der Institutionen verrin-
gern.  
Als ein vorläufiges Ergebnis der Analyse kann festgehalten werden, dass – falls sich die 
Entwicklung weiter fortsetzt – nicht die erwarteten Auswirkungen des demographischen 
Wandels das gravierende Problem darstellen. Vielmehr ist die zunehmende Anzahl an 
Personen problematisch, die über eine nur geringe Absicherung gegenüber den materiel-
len Folgen des Eintritts sozialer Risiken verfügen und damit auf die armutsvermeidenden 
Leistungen des sozialen Systems angewiesen sein werden.  
ABSTRACT 
The aim of the study is to analyse the consequences of the changing structure of the la-
bour market for the social security system. It will be shown that in the future the restruc-
turing of the labour force will yield a main challenge for social policy and will have much 
bigger consequences for the social security system than the demographic changes.  
Numerous new forms of employment were caused by the economic process of tertiariza-
tion. Furthermore, these kinds of employment were politically demanded and financially 
supported. However, those forms of employment have their shortcomings. From an indi-
vidualistic point of view there is a shortage in the protection against the financial conse-
quences of social risks (e.g. unemployment, invalidity, illness, or the possibility to save for 
an adequate pension) within the social security system. From an institutionalistic point of 
view the financial basis of the social security systems becomes weaker and weaker as the 
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reduction of the number of employees with a compulsory membership within the social 
security systems will inevitable reduce the contribution revenue of the institutions.  
As a preliminary conclusion it may be said that if the development continues we will not 
be confronted with the expected costs of the demographic changes but with a growing 
number of people with no or a low coverage against social risks. These people will depend 
on a basic system of poverty prevention. 
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1 Introduction  
Over the last years many new forms of employment emerged – often seen within the 
context of the development of the so called new economy. This however is the result of 
two different processes: 1. the tertiarization of the economy and 2. political decisions. 
Therefore, the increase in new forms of employment is not a consequence of a law of na-
ture - it is the result of conscious political influence on the economy to reduce state ex-
penditures and wage costs of firms. In addition the demand side of the labour market 
took advantage of the liberalisation fostering the structural change.  
The causes for the numerous measures in economic policy, fiscal policy, social policy, or 
labour market policy are the alleged or real economic shortfalls. The following aspects be-
long to these shortcomings 
− Too low economic development, 
− Lack of international competitiveness, 
− Missing innovations, 
− Insufficient modernisation of the economy and  
− Too high unemployment rate 
Remarkable social and distributional aspects are virtually missing. This is symptomatic for 
the agenda of political actors, where distributional effects – with the exception of the 
catchword “generational equity” – are at least officially ignored. Therefore it is no wonder 
that many aspects of social security which are strongly connected with the above listed 
points are not taken into account.  
For example if looking at the measures to reduce the unemployment rate, the lack in 
comprehensive view and the ignorance of the interdependence of the social security sys-
tems becomes obvious. Within the scope of reshaping the economy to redress the men-
tioned shortcomings the new forms of employment did not reduce unemployment or 
support the increase of employment as expected, but instead existing forms of employ-
ment were often substituted. This is especially to be seen in the decrease of employees 
with compulsory insurance in the social security system and in the increase of self-
employed people1. As a result forms of employment have arisen over the last years, 
which mean special challenges for the social security systems.  
                                                      
1
 See for example Bögenhold and Fachinger, 2007.  
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2 Structural changes of employment  
The change in employment forms and statuses, which in a welfare state supposed to be 
long since gone, affects dependent workers as well as self-employed people. In the field 
of dependent employment, the following occupations belong to the new forms: Employ-
ees with contracts for work, subcontracted workers, temporary workers, low income jobs, 
mini-jobs, midi-jobs, low paid jobs, 1 Euro jobs, full time low income jobs, marginal em-
ployed people, occupation with partial retirement, capacity oriented working time, job 
sharing, part-time employees, short term occupations, disguised employment. 
These terms are not clearly defined and not differentiated from each other. It is a bundle 
of more or less appropriate characterizations, which are used within scientific discussions, 
in laws, and reports, and the contents are partially overlapping. So sometimes the 
amount of earnings, the working hours, or the legal form of employment are used for dif-
ferentiation. Regarding this confusion of tongues as an expression of the heterogeneity of 
employment, a categorization and systematization according to distributional criteria is 
necessary.  
Concerning the increase of self-employment, the terms, which are used in literature, are 
also heterogeneous. However in principle they refer to three forms of self-employment: 
self-employed people with and without employees, and employed people, which are ad-
ditionally self-employed as a secondary activity. As expression for the first category the 
following terms are coined: 
Solo self-employed, sole entrepreneur, one person entrepreneur, firms without employ-
ees, one-man start ups (Ich-AG), family start ups (Familien-AG), founder of a new busi-
ness, freelancers. 
The development of those kind of employment stem from effects, which are the conse-
quence of two targets of economic policy. In principle the measures should produce two 
outcomes:  
1. Reduction of unemployment and increase of employment respectively through a so 
called transition to a flexible labour market.  
2. Promotion of self-employment to support general economic growth, to obtain an in-
crease in welfare, and to survive the international competition on the basis of innova-
tions.  
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3 Development of employment since the 1990s 
To get an idea about the amount of labour market changes, some statistics are presented 
in the following. It will be shown that an ever-increasing circle is carrying out those as 
new characterized forms of employment.  
3.1 Employees 
A particularly striking development over the last years occurred for the employees, which 
are liable for social insurance. Between 1992 and 2006 a reduction in the absolute num-
bers of about 11 percent took place. Also the quota with respect to all employed people 
dropped down by approximately 13 percent from 77.1 to 67.4.  
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Figure 1. Compulsory Insured Employees in Millions 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Beschäftigungsstatistik. 
The number and share of employed people which are not compulsory liable for social in-
surance and which are therefore without any direct protection of the social security sys-
tem mirror imaged the decline. The absolute number increased around 46 percent from 
8.7 to 12.8 million. As a result today approximately 32.6 percent of all employed people in 
Germany are not integrated in the social security system.  
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Figure 2. Not Compulsory Insured Employees in Millions 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Beschäftigungsstatistik. 
Not only is the general coverage by the social security system relevant but also the extent 
of insurance. This holds true because of the equivalence of transfers for income replace-
ment, if a social risk occurs. So low income e.g. because of part-time work determines low 
transfers from the statutory pension system (GRV) or from the unemployment insurance. 
To form a picture of the amount of those people the following figure shows the develop-
ment since the end of the 1990s.  
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Note: Because of the Zweite Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt from 23th of December 
2002 (BGBl I, S. 4621) the registration system of marginal employed people was changed with effect from 1. 
April 2003.  
Figure 3. Marginal Employed People in Germany in Millions 
Source: Various reports of Deutsche Rentenversicherung Knappschaft–Bahn–See/Minijob-Zentrale. 
3.2 Self-employed people 
Economic policy representatives gave much hope to the idea of self-employed people 
solving the above mentioned economic problems. To what extent the specific measures 
have increased self-employment is difficult to judge. However, over the last 15 years an 
increase of self-employment in both the absolute number and the quota took place.  
This development is accompanied by structural changes within the group of self-
employed. As can be seen in the following figure, the increase since the middle of 1990s is 
almost solely marked by the self-employed people without employees whereas the share 
of self-employed with employees remained roughly the same.  
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Figure 4. Self-employed People in Germany in Percent of the Labour Force 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the scientific use files of the microcensus of the Federal Statistical 
Office Germany. 
The development was very heterogeneous between and within the economic sectors. 
Where a reduction took place in the agricultural sector, a noticeable increase occurs es-
pecially in the building and the service sector.  
Within the scope of the structural changes in employment, new forms of employment 
took shape regarding the self-employed people in particular. Beside the classical forms of 
workmen, farmers, journalists, artists, or free professions, meanwhile a great variety of 
freelancers exists. The majority of freelancers are located within the service sector with 
an emphasis in the field of consultation, care, I & T, and advertising. 
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Figure 5. Freelancers in Germany in Thousands 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the scientific use files of the microcensus of the Federal Statisti-
cal Office Germany. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the number of freelancers without employees was already 
three times higher than the one of those with employees. However until 2004 the propor-
tion got even worst. In more than 80 percent of the cases a free profession is carried out 
by self-employed people without further personnel assistance. As the freelancers form 
about 20 percent of all self-employed people in Germany, this is one reason for the gen-
eral increase of self-employed people without employees. 
Some essential aspects of the structural changes in employment are characterized by 
these few but striking information. It should be emphasized once more, that this is not a 
side issue of the economic development but the dynamic changing structure is of quanti-
tatively considerable importance as the following numbers impressively substantiate:  
− Between 1992 and 2006 an increase of about 4 million employed people with-
out any insurance in the social security system up to 12.8 million took place.  
− 4.5 million people carried out part time work in 2006. 
− 6.3 million people were marginal employed in 2006. 
− Approximately 4 million self-employed people existed of whom around 2/3 
were solo self-employed in 2004.  
In principle the structural changes in employment are characterised by  
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− an increase in people without or with a reduced protection against the material 
consequences of the occurrence of any social risk (e.g. unemployment, invalid-
ity, illness, or the possibility to save for an adequate pension) 
− an increase in people, who have low income on average.  
Over the last couple of years employment statuses increased which are potentially prob-
lematic from a social and distributional point of view. However it is not clear how far this 
will actually be true mainly because there is a lack of information on the household situa-
tion these people live in. This is important because labour supply decisions are made in 
the household context. So it might be the case that a household member already is mem-
ber of the social security system and therefore additional protection is not necessary – 
especially in systems which provide transfers in kind. 
Even the short characterisation above shows, that the massive reshaping and the struc-
tural changes of the employment forms mean a great challenge for the social security sys-
tems and define a variform field of research.  
4 Implications for social security  
The effects of the structural changes of employment comprise the whole social and dis-
tributional policy. This requires a comprehensive, all systems overlapping approach of 
analysis. Without such a view, the interdependence of the social security systems – espe-
cially its financial intertwining – can not be taken into account. An isolated analysis of sin-
gle elements of the system – such as GRV or the insurance against the financial risks of 
unemployment – would come too short.  
To analyse the massive effects on the social security system, which the structural changes 
cause, a categorization in institutions and households or individuals suggests itself as a 
first step. From an individual point of view, the new forms of employment often lack ele-
ments of insurance against the financial consequences of the incidence of social risks. 
From an institutional point of view, the financial basis of the social insurance system gets 
weaker step by step.  
4.1 Institutional aspects 
The structural changes – reduction of the number of employees and the reduction of the 
basis of assessment as a result e.g. of part time work, mini-, and midi-jobs – cause lower 
revenues. The problem especially in a pay-as-you-go (contribution or tax) financed system 
is the reduction of employment, that not necessarily goes hand in hand with the reduc-
tion of transfers. This would only be the case if people leave the social security system or 
lose their entitlements completely. However this is not always the case and differs be-
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tween the social security systems. To analyze the effects it is therefore necessary to dif-
ferentiate between the systems.  
Related to the GRV the changes of employment between 1992 and 2006 from 29.3 to 
26.4 million mean a reduction of around 11 percent. As a rule of thump, the change of 
100,000 people results in an increase or decrease of revenues of about 500 million Euros. 
Therefore the reduction of employed people leads to a decrease of about 15 billion Euros 
in 2006 compared to 19922.  
To get an idea of the magnitude of the 15 billion Euros it should be emphasized that this 
is about 9 percent of the total revenues of the GRV in the year 20043. A variation in the 
contribution rate of 1 percentage point results in around 8.8 billion Euros of more or less 
revenues. Would the number of employees be held constant over time, the contribution 
rate of the GRV would be ceteris paribus around 1.7 percentage points lower.  
However it has to be kept in mind that the lower numbers of people with coverage in the 
GRV lead not only to a loss in revenues but those people also are no longer able to accu-
mulate entitlements. Therefore the total expenditures ceteris paribus will be lower in the 
future.  
Compared to the GRV the connection between expenditures and revenues in the unem-
ployment insurance system is more direct. As a voluntary insurance is not possible in the 
unemployment security system the revenues but also – after a time of transition – the en-
titlements will decrease.   
Such equivalence between benefits and contributions (give and take) as in the GRV or un-
employment insurance – which has been undermined with the new legislation since 
20004 – does not exist in all social security systems, especially if the systems provide 
transfers in kind instead of transfers in cash. This issue will be addressed exemplary on 
the basis of the statutory health insurance (GKV).  
It has to be considered for the GKV that the insurance coverage may continue even after 
the end of an employment, as it is possible for example to voluntarily maintain the insur-
ance. The contributions are income related as a rule, but the transfers are independent of 
the contributions. As far as the income in the new job is lower than that during the previ-
ous employment, the revenues of the security system therefore will also be lower with-
                                                      
2
 It is assumed that the previously compulsory insured people did not choose reinstatement within the 
GRV.  
3
 In the year 2004 the revenues were about 169.4 billion Euros; VDR, 2004: 3.  
4
 See e. g. Schmähl (2007b) or Ginn et al., 2007. 
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out lower transfers in kind. As a result, this leads inevitable to financial problems, which 
among other things could be solved by reducing the benefit level or by raising the contri-
bution rate.  
However not only the reduction of employment or leaving of the social security system 
yields problems with respect to the financing but also the reduction of the contribution 
paid by the insured people because of the partly or complete exemption of contribution 
for special forms of employment – deferred compensation for pension within the scope 
of occupational pensions is part of that5. 
Additionally the financial intertwining between the social security systems among each 
other and to other public budgets is not without its problems6. In the past easing the bur-
den of public budget took place at the expense of the social security system7. An example 
is the accompanying budget law of 2006. In this the contributions of recipients of unem-
ployment benefits II were reduced from 75 Euros per month to 40 Euros per month. To 
compensate the loss in contributions in the GRV the rate of contribution had to be raised 
for 0.2 percentage points.  
Furthermore it has to be considered that if individuals are no longer covered by the social 
security system the last net of security – the income tested social assistance – is responsi-
ble.  
Today there exists an institutional intertwining of financing and benefits, which in its ac-
tual dimension is unknown. This situation was deliberately caused by the politicians. It 
enables to use the social security system as “shunting station” and to use them to under-
cover easing of the burden of the national budget. Up to now the multiple cohesions of 
the effects were seldom topics of social and distributional analysis.  
4.2 Individual aspects 
From a social political view the new forms of employment are a problem, if the people 
are not at all or only marginal insured against the material consequences of the occur-
rence of social risks. The taking up of self-employment following an education or the 
change of employment can lead to the loss of security against social risks.  
                                                      
5
 See e.g. Schmähl, 2007a. 
6
  See for an in-depth study of the German system Henke and Schmähl, 2001. 
7
 A striking example is the introduction of the long term care insurance in 1995/1996 and since 1989 a 
large part of the financial burden on the so-called re-unification has to be carried by the social insur-
ance system or rather by the employees who are paying the social security contributions.  
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This can be exemplified with the statutory pension insurance GRV. If people leave the 
GRV they are not only longer able to achieve further entitlements for a pension but they 
also lose entitlements in the case of invalidity or benefits for rehabilitation.  
Hereby loopholes in the social protection arise, which can not be filled by a private insur-
ance. Reasons for that are 
1. the non-existence of an insurance – like against unemployment or a drop in or-
ders, 
2. risk selection by the private insurer  
3. with increasing age of entry the contributions are also increased, i. e. the older 
a person, the higher the contribution. 
The financing of private insurance is carried out by so called premiums, which has to be 
paid by each person8 and is independent of the economic situation and of the secured in-
come. That implies that the relative income burden is regressive and that it is the more, 
the lower the income is. The following figure shows the problem exemplified by the GRV. 
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Figure 6. Burden of Different Contributions 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                                      
8
 In private insurance, there exists no free family membership.  
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The minimum contribution of 78 Euro comes to a monthly pension of 4.27 Euro. After 45 
years of payment of contributions the monthly pension is about 192 Euro and therefore 
much lower than the level of the means-tested social assistance9. Even if the person pays 
contribution of halve of the so-called standard contribution (Regelbeitrag) of about 239 
Euro per month, the monthly pension will be lower than 600 Euro after 45 years of pay-
ment. 
This illustrates a further problem: From an individual point of view it does not make sense 
to pay contributions if the potential entitlements are lower than the level of social assis-
tance. It is to be assumed that with a low level of financial security or with low equiva-
lence between contributions and benefits the resistance against contributions will be 
relatively high and a protection will be purposefully avoided. This behaviour is boosted by 
the discussion about social security and the conversion of the welfare state towards a ba-
sic system with means tested benefits10. 
Therefore this is not only about people, who are not covered by the measures of the sys-
tem, but explicitly about people, which are not able to meet the legal obligation. The con-
version of the social security system with respect to disguised employment has clearly 
shown that a legal obligation is by no means sufficient, to identify all employees. Numer-
ous self employed people, which are liable to insurance according to article 2 of the social 
code VI, did not satisfy laws and regulations – the same is true for artists and journalists11.  
Basically problems of social security arise from  
− lack of willingness to save and  
− lack of ability to save for financial security. 
Whereas the low incomes of the new forms of employment affect the ability to save, the 
willingness to save is spoiled by the way of the discussion about the social security system 
and by the mass media propagating one nightmare scenario after another with public ap-
peal. Public opinion polls meanwhile indicate a considerable loss of confidence in the so-
cial security system.  
5 Some concluding remarks 
On one hand the structural changes are the result of the tertiarization of the economy 
and of the developing service oriented society. However on the other hand, the process 
                                                      
9
 Which is 345 Euro per month; article 20 of the Social Code II. 
10
 See e.g. Ginn et al., 2007. 
11
 See Fachinger et al., 2004. 
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was caused by extensive economic, fiscal, labour market and social policy measures to 
promote the general economic development, to reduce the unemployment rate, and to 
an early adaptation of the demographic change. Furthermore, the measures serve to re-
duce the public expenditure and to provide firms with low cost employees. This was sup-
ported by the argument of the alleged overpriced non-wage labour costs12 and the de-
mand for maintenance respectively restoration of the international competitiveness.  
Among all this, the social-political consequences were more or less disregarded. Once 
more it is a policy, which neglects the interdependence of the systems – the fiscal and so-
cial security system are among those – and where the distributional effects are not taken 
into account. An isolated consideration normally will lead to unintended effects of the 
measures at the risk of thwarting the expected results at least partially13. Within the 
scope of reshaping the economy the new forms of employment did not reduce unem-
ployment or support the increase of employment as expected, but instead existing forms 
of employment were often substituted. 
The reduction of the non-wage labour costs and of the public expenditures in principle 
took place by passing on the financial burden of protection against the occurrence of so-
cial risks to private households – and for those it results in an additional increase of the 
burden. Within the derivation of the positive economic effects it was assumed that pri-
vate households would not substitute or shift the burden, but – if anything – compensa-
tion was supposed14.  
If the structural changes continue any further we will not be confronted with the ex-
pected costs of the demographic changes but by a growing number of people with no or a 
                                                      
12
 In the public discussion only the absolute and percentual burden of employers was taken into account 
and other factors such as the productivity of the employees were totally disregarded.  
13
 Over the last decades this policy was characteristic for the GRV, which was extremely reduced viewed 
only as a pure individualistic old age security system – neglecting all the other social risks, which are 
also covered by the GRV, e.g. rehabilitation, invalidity, provision for dependants.  
14
 A noteworthy example is the assumption that private households will voluntarily save 4 percent of 
their gross earnings to compensate for the reduction of the proficiency level of the GRV up to the year 
2020. The possibility of substitution or passing on the burden was barely discussed. However it is a 
mystery why households should react with higher savings to hold their alleged benefit level constant at 
the beginning of the retirement phase. Only the overall replacement rate – calculated as the relation of 
the average of the last earnings and the average of the first pension – was taken into account. The ad-
justment of pensions during the retirement phase was totally neglected. Before the pension reforms 
since 2000 the pre-calculated contribution rate of 22 percent in 2020 would have been paid by the 
employers and employees one half each. In contrast now the calculated burden in the year 2020 will 
be 11 percent for employers and employees and additional 4 percent for the private households. 
Therefore, an easing of the burden of employers of around 8.3 percent and an increase for private 
households of 25 percent will take place; see for further considerations Schmähl, 2004. 
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low coverage against social risks, which was intentionally forced by political measures. 
These people depend on a basic system to prevent a live underneath the poverty line. 
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